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Limiting Discovery of a Defendant's Wealth When
Punitive Damages Are Alleged
Stephen E. Woodbury*
Plaintiff's attorneys often include in their complaints a claim for
punitive damages1 in addition to compensatory damages. This alle-
gation allows them, in the discovery process, to request informa-
tion concerning the defendant's financial worth. Such a request,
through interrogatories, document productions, or depositions,
would be irrelevant but for the punitive damages claim because a
defendant's wealth has nothing to do with a defendant's culpabil-
ity for a compensatory damage claim.2 This information is rele-
vant, however, for the punitive damage claim because in order for
the jury to achieve the purpose in awarding punitive damages-to
punish the defendant and deter others from similar conduct'-the
* J.D., University of Michigan; B.A., University of Chicago; Member, State Bar of New
Mexico.
1. These damages are awarded to the plaintiff when the defendant's conduct has been
outrageous. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may
be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others."). The basis for these damages is often statu-
tory. See, e.g., Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 n.1 (Colo. 1980), where the court
explained:
In Colorado, a claim for punitive damages must be predicated upon section 13-21-102,
C.R.S. 1973, which provides: "In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a
jury for a wrong done to a person, or to personal or real property, and the injury
complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or insult, or a wanton
and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, the jury, in addition
to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary
damages."
Id.
2. See, e.g., Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 770 ("It is too plain for cavil that
the interrogatories in issue would not be relevant if punitive damages were not in issue. It
has long been established as a principle of tort law that in suits involving the assessment of
compensatory damages, evidence of a defendant's financial status is inadmissable.").
3. See, e.g., Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1981) ("The design of puni-
tive damages is deterrence through public condemnation. ... ); Leidholt v. District Court,
619 P.2d at 770 ("The purpose of punitive damages is . . . to punish the defendant and to
deter others from similar conduct in the future"); Cox v. Theus, 569 P.2d 447, 450 (Okla.
1977) ("The theory is the punishment of the offender, for the general benefit of society. The
imposition of this type of damages seeks to act as a restraint to the transgressor.").
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jury must know what amount of money taken away from this par-
ticular defendant will "hurt."
'4
Thus, in this era of liberal discovery, it appears that financial
information regarding a defendant should be easily discoverable.
Nevertheless, potential abuses exist. For example, take the situa-
tion where a computer software company ("Company A") sues a
former employee and his new company ("Company B") for misap-
propriation of trade secrets. Company A includes in its complaint a
claim for punitive damages so that during the discovery process
Company A can request the disclosure of the financial worth of
Company B and the former employee. Company B would complain
that this request is an attempt to gain access to business records
where disclosure would be detrimental.5 The employee would as-
sert that this request intrudes into his personal affairs unnecessa-
rily.' Both defendants would also maintain that complying with
this request would entail unwarranted cost and inconvenience. 7 Fi-
nally, both defendants would allege that the request is being used
to harass and coerce them to settle an otherwise unmeritorious
4. See, e.g., Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 770 ("[I]n determining the amount
which should be awarded as punitive damages, the severity of the defendant's wrong, as well
as the extent of the defendant's assets, must be considered to ensure that the award will
punish the defendant."); Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 107, 108 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1982) ("[E]vidence concerning the financial condition of a defendant is necessary. . . so
that a jury might arrive at an award that will properly punish the defendant.").
5. See, e.g., Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) ("We are
aware that in some cases, a plaintiff, a competitor for instance, might be tempted to include
in a lawsuit a frivolous allegation of conduct supporting punitive damages with the ulterior
purpose of compelled disclosure of defendant's finances."); Richards v. Superior Court, 86
Cal. App. 3d 265, 267, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (1978) ("[T]here is usually the potential that
untoward disclosure of the information obtained may [bring] damage to the discloser in the
competitive business arena.").
6. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 469 F. Supp. 575, 580 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("Defen-
dant's desire not to have each and every detail of their financial condition open to public
scrutiny .. .is an understandable concern ...."); Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d at 139
("[U]nder certain circumstances the privacy interests of the defendant outweigh the discov-
ery rights of the plaintiff. It is difficult to justify compelled disclosure of personal finances
when the allegations of conduct supporting punitive damages have no basis in fact.");
Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 23, 185 A.2d 241, 244 (1962) ("The obviously objec-
tionable features of the present demand are invasion of a traditionally personal and private
domain as well as the inconvenience of disclosing details.").
7. See, e.g., Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80
("As a minimum, there is the time and expense necessary to the compilation of a complex
mass of information unrelated to the substantive claim involved in the lawsuit and relevant
only to the subject matter of a measure of damages which may never be awarded.");
Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. at 23, 185 A.2d at 244 ("Defendant, even when successful




Courts have responded to defendants' requests for a protective
orders prohibiting the discovery of financial information in four
distinct ways. First, a few permit unhampered discovery.10 Second,
many leave it to the discretion of the trial judge to decide in what
manner discovery should proceed." For example, using this ap-
proach courts have allowed: only plaintiff's counsel to obtain the
8. See, e.g., Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1979) ("[T]he threat of
such exposure might be used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to coerce settlements from innocent
defendants."). See also Richards v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 272,
150 Cal. Rptr. at 81, in which the court stated:
It seems a rare instance indeed that the potential of disclosure for purposes unrelated
to the lawsuit or to persons other than counsel and their representatives serves any
purpose except to give a tactical edge to the party who has obtained discovery of the
information by allowing that party the benefit of pressure in settlement negotiations
by threat or implication of disclosure.
Id. See also Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 832, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (1968)
("The threat of having to place a dollar value on one's assets and to disclose that valuation
to strangers may well serve as a powerful weapon to coerce a settlement which is not war-
ranted by the facts of the case."); Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 271, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904,
911 (1975) ("A rule permitting unlimited examination before trial of a defendant as to his
wealth in a punitive damage action could.., constitute undue pressure on defendants in
such actions to compromise unwarranted claims.").
9. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on mat-
ters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only upon specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time and
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired
into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discov-
ery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that
a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way-, (8) that the parties simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
Id. Almost all states have adopted this rule as part of their discovery procedures.
10. See State ex rel. Thesman v. Dooley, 270 Or. 37, 526 P.2d 563 (1974); Ruiz v.
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (1981); Thoresen v. Superior Court,
11 Ariz. App. 62, 461 P.2d 706 (1969); Lewis v. Moody, 195 So.2d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ille, 87 F.R.D. 540 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Holliman v.
Redman Dev. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 488 (D.S.C. 1973).
11. See Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980);
Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978); Luria Bros. & Co.
v. Allen, 469 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1979); State ex rel. Kubatzky v. Holt, 483 S.W.2d 799
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
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information;12 only plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff to obtain
the information; 8 and postponing discovery until sixty or ninety
days prior to trial." Third, many require the plaintiff to make
some type of factual showing that a viable claim of punitive dam-
ages exists before allowing discovery." Fourth, a few prohibit dis-
covery until after a jury has found the defendant liable for puni-
tive damages; this creates a split-trial procedure. 6
In Chenoweth v. Schaaf, 1 a Pennsylvania federal court adopted
the third approach. In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff
sought to discover the defendant doctors' financial circumstances
on the basis of a "complaint [with] nothing other than statements,
conclusive in nature."1 8 The court acknowledged that this request
was for relevant information due to the punitive damage claim."9
However, the court refused to permit discovery because it would be
improper to allow "inquiry into a particularly sensitive and per-
haps irrelevant aspect of a defendant's life"'20 without "demon-
strat[ing] to the court at least a real possibility that punitive dam-
12. See Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980);
Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978); Luria Bros. & Co.
v. Allen, 469 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
13. See State ex rel. Kubatzky v. Holt, 483 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
14. See Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980);
Cobb v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1979).
15. See Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981); Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400,
614 S.W.2d 671 (1981); Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768; Tennant v. Charlton, 377
So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1979); Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 107 (Del. Super. Ct.
1982); Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d 134; Stern v. Abramson, 150 N.J. Super. 571, 376 A.2d
221 (1977) (dictum); Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241 (1962); Chenoweth
v. Schaaf, 98 F.R.D. 587 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D.
Hawaii 1975).
This is also the position taken by the Defense Research Institute. See Wall St. J., Nov. 12,
1984, at 27, col. 4.
16. See Cox v. Theus, 569 P.2d 447 (Okla. 1977); Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368
N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975).
17. 98 F.R.D. 587 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
18. Id. at 589.
19. Id. In the court's words:
Under the liberal rules concerning discovery in federal court, such may be had con-
cerning all items, relevant to the subject matter involved, so long as it is not privi-
leged material. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For instance, were it previously determined
that a defendant's conduct was such so as to allow the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages, then, disclosure of the general net worth of said defendant is appropriate.
On the other hand, should a complaint read solely in negligence, then the general net





ages will be at issue" at trial.2 In its decision, the court noted
several conflicting Pennsylvania county court cases on this issue
which it was not bound to follow.
This article agrees with the Chenoweth approach and argues
that the question of the discovery of a defendant's wealth should
be resolved after discovery on the merits is concluded. Then, the
plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of a triable issue on the
defendant's liability for punitive damages in a "mini-trial, 2
before discovery is allowed. When allowed, the defendant should
only be required to reveal his net worth and recent income tax re-
turns to plaintiff's counsel and sometimes to the plaintiff as well.
Only this procedure properly balances: the defendant's interest in
privacy and avoiding inconvenience; the plaintiff's need to discover
relevant information in time to either settle the case or prepare for
trial; and the judicial system's concern in preventing the discovery
process from being used for ulterior motives.
Part I explains the shortcomings of the following approaches:
unfettered disclosure; allowing a trial judge to fashion a protective
order to each individual case; and, preventing disclosure until a
jury decides the merits of the punitive damage claim. Part II out-
lines the proposed standard, including a discussion of the follow-
ing: what type of prima facie showing of the defendant's liability
for punitive damages the plaintiff should make; when this showing
should be made during the period for discovery; how detailed the
disclosure should be; and, what additional precautions should be
taken after disclosure.
I. THE INADEQUATE ALTERNATIVES
A. During the Discovery Period
1. Unfettered Access
A few courts have ordered the defendant to disclose his financial
records upon the plaintiff's request during the discovery period,
without proof of the validity of the punitive damage claim or re-
stricting who will have access to such information once disclosed.2"
In State ex rel. Thesman v. Dooley,2 for example, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for fraud and deceit, and included a punitive
21. Id.
22. Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 772 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
23. See supra note 10.
24. 270 Or. 37, 526 P.2d 563 (1974).
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damage claim in his complaint. The Oregon Supreme Court denied
the defendant's contention that a prima facie showing of punitive
damages must be made before the defendant's financial worth, as
shown through income tax records and business balance sheets,
should be disclosed. Rather, the court held that the plaintiff could
inquire into the defendant's financial status at the time of the de-
fendant's deposition. It reached this conclusion because the evi-
dence was material and relevant to the plaintiff's punitive damage
claim. In addition, the requested procedure would impede judicial
economy by "requiring the plaintiff to prove his case twice."25
However, the Oregon Supreme Court, like other courts allowing
unfettered access of a defendant's wealth based on its relevance,
was not presented with the objection that the discovery would un-
duly delve into the defendant's personal affairs, cause unwarranted
inconvenience, or be a use of the discovery process for ulterior mo-
tives.2 When defense attorneys concede relevance and argue, for
example, that "consideration must be given to the defendant's
right to privacy and his right to protection from harassment,
'27
courts universally provide some form of protection."
The Oregon court is the only court which allows unhampered ac-
cess to a defendant's financial worth, using the additional rationale
that requiring a prima facie showing of the punitive damage claim
would waste judicial resources by mandating a separate hearing.
This point is of minor significance. First, the potential for abuse is
so evident that whatever inefficiency results from this rule is worth
the alternative of forcing defendants to disclose confidential infor-
mation on the basis of a "naked allegation" 2 9 of punitive damages.
Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court took this privacy interest to
a near-constitutional level when it required the plaintiff to prove a
prima facie case of a legal right to punitive damages before permit-
ting discovery.30 That court stated: "[N]o doubt our rules were
designed to improve and expedite trials, but not at the expense of
25. Id. at 566.
26. See, e.g., Lewis v. Moody, 195 So.2d at 261 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1967) ("The defen-
dant does not object to the interrogatories on the basis .. . that they seek unwarranted
financial details and tend to embarrass and harass him. Respondent's contention is that no
pretrial discovery as to financial worth should be permitted because such evidence will not
be relevant . . ").
27. Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d at 108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
28. See, e.g., id.; Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 768.
29. Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d at 108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
30. Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671 (1981).
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basic fundamental rights." 3' Second, the inefficiency argument is
exaggerated because time and expense would not be expended in
those cases where the plaintiff, after completing discovery on the
merits, declined to attempt to make the prima facie showing be-
cause it would be futile.32 Third, if the standard for such a showing
is not one of proof of a legal right to punitive damages, but merely
one of a triable issue, the time expended to prepare and present
such a case would not be as great.
2. Granting the Trial Judge the Discretion to Fashion a Protec-
tive Order
Many courts hold that a defendant's wealth should be discovera-
ble, but that courts should use their discretion in each particular
case to limit the dissemination of that information so that there is
minimal intrusion into a defendant's finances. 33 This approach
conforms to the usual manner in which protective orders are given,
leaving the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Courts have exercised
this discretion in a number of ways.34 In State ex rel. Kubatzky v.
Holt,35 for example, a Missouri appellate court held the defen-
dant's answers to interrogatories concerning gross earnings, income
tax returns, and net worth should be discoverable, but only the
plaintiff and his counsel should have access to this information.
This holding invalidated the trial court's protective order which
would have kept the answers sealed until the defendant was found
liable for punitive damages at trial. The appellate court reached
this result by finding the defendant's privacy concern "sub-
servient" to the need for discovery, particularly since the informa-
tion would go no further than to the plaintiff and his counsel.
There is much merit in this approach of giving the trial court
broad discretion to fashion protective orders. It is flexible, allowing
the trial judge to create orders "appropriate for each individual
case."36 It creates judicial economy by not requiring a "mini-
trial"37 where the plaintiff must make a prima facie case for puni-
tive damages. Additionally, it does not require a further set of in-
terrogatories or other discovery device, after the plaintiff prevails
31. Id. at 674.
32. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 271, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 913 (1975).
33. See supra note 11.
34. See supra notes 12-14.
35. 483 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
36. Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 772-73 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 772.
1985
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at the mini-trial. 8 Moreover, settlement negotiations may be
stalled until this information is produced.3 9 Finally, placing the
burden of proof on the defendant makes sense for the purpose of
proving inconvenience and cost in producing the information since
it is the defendant who can best establish that fact.
Nevertheless, this discretionary approach has serious flaws.
First, and most importantly, this rule assumes that many, if not
most, of the inquiries concerning a defendant's wealth will not ha-
rass the defendant or be used for ulterior motives, such as coercing
a settlement due to the threat of obtaining confidential business
records. This assumption ignores the inherently private nature of
financial information. It is simply not necessary that a defendant
prove that disclosing this information would be intrusive. The fact
that "causes of action for punitive damages have become very easy
to allege,"40 should mandate that the inherently private nature of
financial information should have some degree of protection.
Second, trial judges vary in their perception of the means and
importance of adequately protecting the defendant's confidential-
ity interest, due to their differences in values and competence.
Thus, appeals of the trial judge's order will often be made,41 and
attorneys will "shop" for a more favorable judge. These concerns,
and others stemming from the discrepancy among local trial
judges, helped to influence the Chenoweth court to adopt a firm
rule requiring a prima facie showing of punitive damages before
permitting discovery of a defendant's wealth. 42
Third, the purported gains in judicial economy, which pale in
significance to protecting a defendant's privacy, are overstated. In
order for a judge to fashion a protective order appropriate to each
case he would have to conduct a hearing concerning the competing
interests of the opposing parties. In addition, judicial resources
would be spared when the plaintiff declined to make a prima facie




40. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (1978). See
also Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 27, col. 4: "Punitive damage claims, which used to be
reserved for defendants who acted recklessly or maliciously, are cropping up in more and
more suits. Plaintiffs' lawyers who might have sued just to compensate for injury 10 years
ago now routinely sue for punitive damages as well." Id.
41. See, e.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980)
(completely revising trial court's protective order).
42. See Chenoweth v. Schaaf, 98 F.R.D. at 589 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
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Fourth, although it may seem that delaying the discovery of this
information may delay settlement in those cases where the puni-
tive damage claim is warranted, most cases are not settled until
after discovery is concluded because only at that point do the par-
ties know the strength of the plaintiff's case.
B. The Split-Trial Procedure
Two courts have stated that the defendant's wealth should not
be disclosed until after the jury has rendered a special verdict that
the defendant is liable for punitive damages.43 These courts pur-
portedly used different rationales to adopt this split-trial proce-
dure. A lower New York court was concerned with protecting the
privacy of defendants when plausible punitive damage claims
could so easily be alleged."" It feared that defendants faced with
disclosure would choose to "compromise unwarranted claims.""
On the other hand, an Oklahoma court employed the questionable
reasoning that since punitive damages benefit society by deterring
conduct similarly outrageous, the plaintiff had only an "incidental
personal interest" and not a "real interest" in obtaining such dam-
ages, so he could not engage in pretrial discovery of a defendant's
wealth." In reality, it appears this court was actually concerned
with the defendant's privacy because the court noted the requested
discovery was "based on an allegation, and not evidence to justify
punitive damages.
' '47
Although the split-trial procedure is based on legitimate con-
cerns of the defendant's privacy, it is not the best solution to the
problem. First, there would be a delay between the first trial on
the merits of the punitive damage claim, and the second trial to
assess the damages in light of the new information regarding the
defendant's wealth. Some time would be needed for the plaintiff's
lawyer to analyze and question the disclosed information and pre-
pare his presentation to a jury.4s If the delay were sufficiently long
so that another jury had to be convened, the new jury would have
to hear the evidence regarding the merits of the punitive damage
43. See supra note 16.
44. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d at 271, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 911 (1975).
45. Id.
46. Cox v. Theus, 569 P.2d at 450 (Okla. 1977).
47. Id. at 499.
48. See Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d at 138 ("The split-trial procedure will inevitably
be accompanied by a delay between the first and second trials. It will often be impossible to
retain for the punitive damages trial the jury which sat in the first trial.").
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claim in order to properly assess the damages 49-a great waste of
judicial resources that raises questions of fairness. Second, some
states do not have established split-trial rules or procedure,50 so
adopting this discovery approach would create some temporary
disorder before this approach could be used with effectiveness.
Third, the procedure reduces the chance for settlement since the
plaintiff is never aware of what he could possibly collect from the
defendant before trial.5 1
II. THE PROPER STANDARD: PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF A TRIABLE
CLAIM OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The best procedure is to require the plaintiff to make a prima
facie showing of the defendant's liability for damages before the
plaintiff can discover the defendant's wealth. This was the ap-
proach suggested by a Pennsylvania federal court in Chenoweth v.
Schaaf.52 This practice accomplishes the following objectives: pro-
tects defendants from unwarranted intrusions into their private af-
fairs;53 prevents defendants from being unnecessarily inconve-
nienced and incurring expenses in producing the information; 5"
precludes plaintiffs from using the discovery process for ulterior
motives; 55 gives plaintiffs counsel all relevant information in time
to settle the case or prepare for trial;" and, checks the inconsis-
tency of trial judges by establishing a firm rather than discretion-
ary standard.5 7 Still, the mechanics of this approach needs to be
clarified. Specifically, four questions need to be answered: what
type of prima facie showing should be required; when should such
a showing be made in the discovery process; how much detail con-
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977) ("In assessing punitive dam-
ages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature
and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and
the wealth of the defendant.").
50. See Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d at 138 ("[S]plit-trial proceedings are rarely used
in non-criminal cases in Tennessee. There is no established rule or procedure governing
their operation.").
51. See id. at 139 ("We wonder how the parties can make an intelligent effort to settle
when one party is deprived of information on which damages are based.").
52. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 6.
54. See supra note 7.
55. See supra notes 5 & 8.
56. See Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d at 140 ("[Tlhe plaintiff who meets the factual
basis test will be able to obtain discovery in time for trial preparation and/or settlement
negotiations.").
57. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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cerning the defendant's wealth should be disclosed; and, what
other safeguards should be taken after disclosure is made. These
questions are resolved below.
A. The Type of Prima Facie Showing Required
Courts have used three standards for the type of prima facie
showing required of the defendant's liability for punitive damages
before discovery is allowed. These include: a legal right," a triable
issue,69 and a factual basis.'0
The intermediate standard, of a triable issue of punitive dam-
ages, seems preferable. The Chenoweth court used this standard
by requiring proof of "a real possibility that punitive damages will
be at issue" at trial."1 Merely requiring a factual basis could be met
too easily, and would therefore often allow an intrusion into the
defendant's financial affairs when the plaintiff could not reasona-
bly be expected to credibly bring the issue to trial. On the other
hand, proof of a legal right might preclude discovery by a judge,
when a jury would still hear the issue at trial. Moreover, this strict
standard would prevent settlements before trial. Thus the stan-
dard which best balances the need of the plaintiff to obtain the
information in advance of trial with the defendant's concern that
there be a legitimate need for the information requested, is requir-
ing the plaintiff to make a prima facie case of a triable issue of the
defendant's liability for punitive damages in a "mini-trial."
B. The Timing of Disclosure
Most courts, including the Chenoweth court, do not address the
question of when the plaintiff should have to make his prima facie
case for punitive damages. 2 It is logical to assume, however, that
58. See Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 403-04, 614 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1981); Stern v.
Abramson, 150 N.J. Super. 571, 575, 376 A.2d 221, 223 (1977) (dictum); Gierman v. Toman,
77 N.J. Super. 18, 23, 185 A.2d 241, 244 (1962).
59. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1131 n.10, 1132 (Wyo. 1981) ("a viable claim/
issue"); Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 771 n.3 ("a triable issue" means "a showing
of a reasonable likelihood that the issue will ultimately be submitted to the jury for resolu-
tion."); Bryan v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d at 108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982)
("[RJeasonably likely that a triable issue as to defendant's liability for punitive damages
exists .... ).
60. Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So.2d at 1170 (Fla. 1979); Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d
at 140; Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. at 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975) ("claim for punitive
damages is not spurious").
61. Chenoweth v. Schaaf, 98 F.R.D. at 589 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
62. See, e.g., Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981); Bryan v. Thos. Best &
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the opportunity for discovery of a defendant's wealth should not
arise until after discovery on the merits is concluded. Otherwise,
the plaintiff could make an early attempt to make a prima facie
case without all of the pertinent evidence on the issue before the
court. Additionally, the potential exists for harassing the defen-
dant and wasting judicial resources through repeated attempts by
the plaintiff to make the requisite showing.
It is important that appellate courts make this rule clear. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court only suggested that the
mini-trial be held after discovery on the merits was completed, 63
allowing a lower appellate court to give a plaintiff multiple chances
to prove his case during the discovery period.64
C. The Details of Disclosure
Courts disagree on how detailed the disclosure of the defendant's
financial worth must be, after a prima facie case is made. Some
maintain that a sworn statement of the defendant's net worth, ac-
companied by recent income tax returns, would be sufficient.65
They point out that allowing the plaintiff to question the defen-
dant about specific details of his finances would "constitute unnec-
essary harassment"66 and create inconvenience and undue expense.
The Chenoweth court went even further in dictum and maintained
that it would prohibit discovery of a defendant's income tax re-
turns because they "include[] more information than necessary for
this inquiry," and it also would prohibit disclosure of questions re-
lating to specific assets and liabilities.
67
Although these courts have a legitimate concern in protecting
the defendant, their position fails to adequately guard the plaintiff
from the defendant making too conservative an estimate of his net
worth." Therefore, as the Florida Supreme Court has ruled, the
Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 107 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
63. Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 771 ("Following discovery of the facts relat-
ing to the liability issues and the claim for punitive damages .... ").
64. Savio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
65. See Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1979) (net
worth only); Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975) (net worth and in-
come tax returns for previous five years); Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J. Super. 18, 185 A.2d
245 (1962) (net worth only).
66. Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d at 771; Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App.
3d at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (1979).
67. Chenoweth v. Schaaf, 98 F.R.D. 587, 590 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
68. See Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So.2d at 1170 (Fla. 1979), in which the court stated
that:
We know from experience that one party frequently minimizes his financial ability to
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plaintiff should be given "reasonable latitude" to ask questions
about the disposition of the individual assets and liabilities men-
tioned in the net worth statement and income tax returns pro-
duced by the defendant."
D. Protection After Disclosure
After the plaintiff establishes a right to discover the defendant's
wealth at the mini-trial, the defendant should receive protection
against public disclosure until the case goes to trial.7 0 This rule en-
hances settlements and allows the plaintiff to prepare his case
without unnecessarily invading the defendant's privacy. In addi-
tion, if the defendant can prove at the mini-trial that the plaintiff
is a business competitor or would otherwise have reason to use the
financial information to the defendant's detriment, the trial judge
could prohibit the plaintiff from having access to the information
and only give it to plaintiff's counsel.
respond when it is an issue in a lawsuit, while the other party often has a tendency to
inflate that same financial ability. Even under oath a party often seems to view an-
other party's financial resources as great or small in direct proportion to the benefit
which will accrue to that party. Thus, it is the height of naivete to suggest that a
sworn statement of one's worth must be accepted as the final word on that important
subject.
Id. (quoting with approval Donahue v. Herbert, 355 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
69. Id. ("The whereabouts of assets disclosed by a recent income tax return, or shown
on a recent financial statement furnished in another situation when the current litigation
was not envisioned is very definitely appropriate inquiry as is the bona fides of the recent
disposition of assets."); Lay v. Kremer, 411 So.2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
("Tennant v. Chariton ... held that a plaintiff was not required to accept on faith a defen-
dant's financial statement but was entitled to discovery as a check on the defendant's credi-
bility. . . . Of course, the trial court has discretion to protect Kremer from unduly vexa-
tious discovery and to protect his secrets."); Medel v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami, 388
So.2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also Breault v. Friedli, 610 S.W.2d at 140, in which
the court held that:
[T]he plaintiffs should be permitted to discover the net worth of the defendants and
the income of each defendant for the last three years. In addition, plaintiffs are enti-
tled to ask questions concerning individual assets and liabilities to the extent that the
trial judge may determine that this is necessary to verify or impeach the general ac-
curacy of the reported income and net worth of the defendants.
Id.
70. See id. at 140 ("If the court determines that the plaintiffs are entitled to disclos-
ure, we prohibit the disclosure of this information to anyone beyond the immediate parties
and counsel to this lawsuit until such time as this action is brought to trial."); Vollert v.
Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975).
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III. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania courts and courts nationwide should establish a
rule so that a defendant's wealth cannot be a matter that a plain-
tiff can expect to discover merely be alleging a claim for punitive
damages. Otherwise, the defendant may be subject to harassment,
inconvenience, expense, and coercion to settle an unmeritorious
lawsuit. Although courts have used a variety of approaches to pro-
tect defendants, the best approach, like that used in Chenoweth,
requires the plaintiff, after concluding discovery on the merits, to
make a prima facie case of a triable issue of punitive damages
before discovery is allowed.
